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ILIJA GARASANIN: NACERTANIJE AND NATIONALISM 
Edislav Manetovic
ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the national thought and policies of Ilija Garasanin.
Garasanin was the first to write a Serbian national programme, Nacertanije, that envisioned
an independent Serbian state. His ideas and policies remain highly controversial. While
some scholars argue that Garasanin was an inclusive Yugoslavist, others maintain that he was
an exclusive Serbian nationalist seeking a Greater Serbia. Both arguments assume that the
South Slav nations are pre-modern social phenomena. In contrast, this paper suggests that a
modernist perspective of nations and nationalism provides a far more coherent and nuanced
interpretation of Garasanin. Garasanin was a Serbian, not a Yugoslav, nationalist. But his
nationalism was inclusive not exclusive. Inclusion was a precondition for social stability of
the large state he wanted to forge. Garasanin was also illiberal. Establishing a state in a
predatory inter-state environment required suppressing individual liberties. Insecurity
caused by a Hobbesian world political system structured the content of Garasanin’s
nationalism.
Introduction
Ilija Garasanin (1812-1874) is one of the most controversial figures in Serbian
and Yugoslavian history. To this day it remains contentious whether his policies
and ideas expressed in Nacertanije (The Outline), the first Serbian national
programme, provided a blueprint for the creation of an inclusive state for the
South Slavs or an exclusive Greater Serbia.1 The fact that Garasanin’s
* I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for valuable comments on an earlier version
of this article.
1 There is a long list of scholars debating whether Garasanin was a Yugoslav or a Greater
Serbian nationalist. For a comprehensive review of the literature see N. Stancic, “Problem
Nacertanija Ilije Garasanina u nasoj historiografiji”, Historijski zbornik XXI-XXII (1971), pp.
179-196; D. MacKenzie, Ilija Garasanin: Balkan Bismarck, Boulder: East European
Monographs, 1985, pp. 56-58; R. Ljusic, Knjiga o Nacertaniju: Nacionalni i drzavni program
Knezevine Srbije, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1993, pp. 18-43. Only few scholars argue that Nacertanije
was neither a Yugoslavist nor a Greater Serbian programme but simply a Serbian national
programme. For this line of argumentation see R. Ljusic, “Ilija Garasanin o srpskoj
drzavnosti”, in V. Stojancevic (ed.), Ilija Garasanin, Belgrade: SANU, 1991, pp. 147-155. An
English translation of Nacertanije is provided by P. Hehn, “The Origins of Modern Pan-
Serbism – The 1844 Nacertanije of Ilija Garasanin: An Analysis and Translation”, East
European Quarterly IX, no. 2 (1975), pp. 158-169.
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Nacertanije is still vigorously contested is a good indication that it remains
salient. It is salient because it implicitly deals with one of the long-lasting
challenges facing all modern (and postmodern) societies – how to manage
differences.2
Much of the scholarly discord about Garasanin’s ideas and policies derives
from two deeply embedded conceptual issues. The first issue is an explicit or
implicit assumption that the South Slav nations are pre-modern social
phenomena. The second conceptual issue that obfuscates Garasanin’s legacy
derives from analysing nationalism without taking into consideration
exogenous factors.
Garasanin was a proponent of a big and strong Serbia. However, Serbia’s
prospective size was not determined by territories which he thought were
138 Edislav Manetovic
2 S. K. Pavlowitch, A History of the Balkans, 1804-1945, London: Longman, 1999, p.
337.
Ilija Garasanin. Lithograph by Anastas Jovanovi≠, 1852.
Source: Digital National Library of Serbia. 
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inhabited by Serbs. The size of the would-be state was determined by what he
perceived to be a predatory international environment. Geo-strategic
considerations, not Serbdom let alone Yugoslavism, shaped the size of the
prospective state. Ensuring the long-term survival of the state in a hostile
international environment required extending Serbia’s borders. The same
considerations were the reason for his inclusive national ideology. Since
territorial increase implied absorbing other nations, social stability of the large
state required offering them recognition. Garasanin’s nationalism was inclusive.
Undoubtedly, recognition was not to be extended to all nations. But this is
not a confirmation that Garasanin was an exclusive nationalist. It is perhaps a
sign that people that had in subsequent decades formed a distinct national
consciousness had not, during Garasanin’s time, embraced nationhood as their
primary, and often totalising, identity. Garasanin himself symbolises those fluid
times. He was the first Serbian statesman to break out of the narrow confines
of Sumadijan patriotism and also the first to voice the slogan “The Balkans for
the Balkan peoples”.3 But the Balkan “peoples” he saw were not the Balkan
nations of subsequent generations. 
It is analytically useful to locate Garasanin’s Nacertanije within the
appropriate historical context of South Slav national formation because
otherwise one could not understand why his vision managed to attract even his
contemporaries from other nations, including from nations he did not recognise.
His nationalism, and most probably the nationalism of his contemporaries, is
best understood as “recovery of the march – redefinition of the development
frontier in favourable (or at least less unequal) terms”.4 That the past that was to
be “recovered” was a non-national past is inconsequential because nationalists
“invent nations where they do not exist”.5 Today, however, South Slav people
know what their nationality is and therefore the strategic direction of the march
that was initiated by their ancestors often seems utopian, even contradictory.
Insecurity emanating from a predatory inter-state system did not only frame
Garasanin’s views on appropriate international relations, but it also structured
his views on individual rights. Studies about Garasanin have not yet
systematically linked his ideas on individual rights with his ideas on world
politics.6 The relationship was inextricable. While the fulfillment of the two
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3 S. Jovanovic, Ustavobranitelji i njihova vlada, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1990 [1912], pp. 430-
431. Sumadija is the central region of Serbia. It is still considered Serbia’s “heartland”.
4 T. Nairn, Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited, London: Verso, 1997, p. 50.
5 E. Gellner, Thought and Change, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964, p. 169.
6 L. Vrkatic, Pojam i bice srpske nacije, Novi Sad: Izdavacka knjizarnica Zorana Stojanovica,
2004, p. 109.
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universal nationalist principles – national sovereignty and popular sovereignty –
required a state, there was a clear hierarchical ordering between the two
principles. He deemed that providing popular sovereignty while simultaneously
working on establishing a sovereign state was impossible. The impossibility
derived from geo-strategic circumstances. Forging a state in an insecure inter-
state environment required suppressing factionalism and, hence, illiberal
policies. Garasanin’s nationalism was illiberal and inclusive.
External freedom was a precondition for internal freedom while inclusion,
not exclusion, was a precondition for social stability. That was how Garasanin
resolved the tension between individual and national interests, on the one
hand, and between state interests and global structures, on the other. 
The content of Garasanin’s nationalism does not accord well with the
conventional interpretation of nationalism, which asserts that there are two
types of nationalism – civic and ethnic. Civic is described as individualistic and
inclusive, while ethnic is collectivistic and exclusive. Neither does Garasanin’s
nationalism accord with what the proponents of the conventional dichotomy
claim is the reason for the two types of nationalism. According to the
dichotomy the two models derive from differences in social structures, cultures,
and/or from ressentiment.7 Garasanin’s case indicates that these society-focused
(endogenous) explanations need to be supplemented with exogenous factors.
Garasanin’s nationalism was influenced primarily, albeit not exclusively, by
insecurity emanating from a Hobbesian inter-state environment.
Garasanin is an important historical figure because he left a material and an
ideational legacy. The former is the centralised state. The latter is his
conceptualisation of the first, and still the best-known, Serbian national
programme, Nacertanije. Although there were earlier programmes that
advocated the restoration of the Serbian state, none of them envisioned Serbia as
an independent state. It was either conceived as vassal of the Ottoman or of the
Habsburg Empires.8 Nacertanije constitutes the ideational framework within
which Serbian statehood developed.9
140 Edislav Manetovic
7 Hans Kohn is an early proponent of the dichotomy. H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism:
A Study in its Origins and Background, New York: Collier Books, 1967. For a more recent
argument see L. Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1992. For a critic of the dichotomy see M. Seymour et. al., “Questioning the
Ethnic/Civic Dichotomy”, in Jocelyne Couture, Kai Nielsen and Michel Seymour (eds),
Rethinking Nationalism, Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1996, pp. 1-64; R. Brubaker,
“Civic and Ethnic Nationalism”, in R. Brubaker (ed.), Ethnicity Without Groups, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
8 Ljusic, Knjiga o Nacertaniju, p. 45.
9 Ljusic, Knjiga o Nacertaniju, p. 5.
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The first section of this study sets the historical stage for analysing the
content of Garasanin’s nationalism. The second analyses Garasanin’s foreign
and domestic policy. It suggests that Garasanin’s foreign policy considerations
structured his domestic policy and illiberal values. The third section reviews the
literature on nationalism and on Nacertanije. It argues that, although the
scholarship differs as to the content of Garasanin’s nationalism, most authors
share the view that South Slav nations are a pre-modern social phenomenon.
Taking a modernist view of the origin of nations, the final section examines
Garasanin’s inclusive nationalism by focusing on Nacertanije.
I. Garasanin in Historical Context
Garasanin’s nationalism reflects wider historical changes taking place on the
world scene regarding the source of state legitimacy. The American and the
French revolutions put forth the already simmering idea of popular and
national sovereignty. It took over one century for this idea to acquire formal
international legitimacy and be voiced by Woodrow Wilson. But even then the
right to national self-determination was not absolute. It was extended only to
European subjects of great empires. Moreover, the viability of the new states
was also deemed an important factor. Hence, in his Fourteen Points Wilson
noted, inter alia, that Serbia had to be given access to the sea.
In the meantime, empires struggled for dominance and stateless nations or
nationless peoples were prodded to act or discouraged from acting
autonomously. Hence, for example, in 1861 France was signalling that the
Ottoman principality of Serbia should take advantage of the Bosnian revolt
against the Ottomans to begin a war for independence.10 In 1866, during the
Austro-Prussian war, Prussia and Italy promised Bosnia to Serbia in order to
nudge Serbia to its side. France promised that even if Austria defeated Prussia
and Italy, France would insist that Bosnia be given to Serbia. In contrast, Russia
insisted that Serbia remain neutral.11 Unlike some great powers, Vienna held
that Bosnia and Herzegovina should either remain Turkish or become
Austrian.12
Ilija Garasanin lived during these times, an era when nationalism and the idea
of nation-states was still emerging. He was born in 1812 in the village of Garasi,
near the central Serbian city of Kragujevac. His father, a wealthy merchant,
Ilija Garasanin: Nacertanije and Nationalism 141
10 MacKenzie, Ilija Garasanin, p. 247.
11 MacKenzie, Ilija Garasanin, p. 285.
12 MacKenzie, Ilija Garasanin, p. 310.
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ensured that Ilija acquired primary education from a private tutor. Then he sent
him to the Habsburg town of Zemun to attend a Greek and later a German high
school. That was the entire formal education Garasanin received. For early
nineteenth-century Serbia Garasanin was considered a well-educated man. 
By the time Garasanin finished his education, the pasalik [province] of
Belgrade had had two uprisings against the Ottomans and was progressively
acquiring more autonomy. The process began with the failed First Serbian
Uprising (1804-1813) and a much shorter, yet much more successful, Second
Uprising (1815).13 The Second Uprising ended after only a few months when
the Sublime Porte and Knez Milos Obrenovic,14 the leader of the uprising,
reached an agreement according to which the Porte proclaimed Milos the
supreme knez, the pasalik of Belgrade acquired some self-rule and, in return,
Belgrade recognised the sultan’s sovereignty.15
Belgrade’s newly acquired autonomy created a serious governing problem.
The pasalik possessed a very rudimentary administrative structure and not even
142 Edislav Manetovic
13 The social preconditions for the First Serbian Uprising were created by the introduction
of the chiflik system that transformed the formerly free peasants into virtual serfs. See  F.
Adanir, “Tradition and Rural Change in Southeastern Europe During Ottoman Rule”, in D.
Chirot (ed.), The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and Politics from
the Middle Ages Until the Early Twentieth Century, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1991, p. 146; L. Stavrianos, The Balkans, 1815-1914, New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1963, pp. 20-22. The Uprising began, however, when the janissaries assassinated 72
village headmen (knez). The remaining knezes were stripped of their status and wealth. Some
of them organised the First Uprising. See J. Halpern and E. A. Hammel, “Serbian Society in
Karadjordje’s Serbia”, in B. Kerewsky Halpern and J. Halpern (eds), Selected Papers on a
Serbian Village: Social Structure as Reflected by History, Demography and Oral Tradition,
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977, p. 25; D. Jankovic, “Vodji i ucesnici prvog
ustanka” in L. Miceta and M. Vucinic (eds), Srbi i demokratija, Belgrade: Vidici, 1992, pp.
14-15; L. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, New York: New York University Press, 2000,
pp. 244-245. The leader of the First Serbian Uprising, Knez Karadjordje Petrovic, became the
founder of the first Serbian dynasty, the Karadjordjevic dynasty. 
14 Milos’ influence derived from the way he helped end the First Uprising. Namely,
when in 1813 most Serbian notables, including Karadjordje, fled Serbia in front of the
advancing Ottoman troops, Milos stayed in his nahija [region] of Rudnik and surrendered.
In return, Milos received two more nahijas and the Ottoman ruler of Belgrade proclaimed
him his adopted son. See V. Karadzic, “Milos Obrenovic, knjaz Srbije ili gradja za srpsku
istoriju nasega vremena”, in Dj. Gavela (ed.), Prvi i drugi srpski ustanak, Belgrade: Matica
srpska, 1969 [1828], p. 261. Milos became the founder of the second Serbian dynasty, the
Obrenovic dynasty.
15 Serbia was allowed to keep the weapons and to hold a national assembly (skupstina).
Taxes and tribute were to continue to be sent to Constantinople. Stavrianos, The Balkans
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the semblance of an educated class. Thus, Milos called upon the more educated
Serbs from the Habsburg Empire to perform the bureaucratic duties.
According to Milos’ doctor, “a great thick cloud” of Habsburg Serbs arrived in
quest of official functions.16 By 1821, Serbia had 87 “intellectuals”, 52 of whom
came from the Habsburg Empire.17
Although ruthless toward his subjects, Milos was a capable diplomat and
increased Serbia’s autonomy vis-à-vis the Sublime Porte. The Hattiserif [sultan’s
edict] of 1830 gave Serbia the status of an autonomous principality and
recognised Milos Obrenovic as a hereditary prince.18 Milos used the newly
acquired power to further limit Ottoman influence by gradually severing all
official contact between the Ottomans and their Christian subjects.19 The
Hattiserif of 1833 officially recognised Milos’ reforms and de jure abolished
feudal relations.
Garasanin’s education and his father’s acquaintance with Prince Milos
Obrenovic enabled him to enter state service as a customs officer in 1834. A few
months later Prince Milos promoted him to a colonel and placed him in charge
of the newly created militia, where he stayed for five years. In 1837 Garasanin
also became a member of the Prince’s Council, the highest government
institution in Serbia.
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since 1453, p. 249. Each musallim [a Turkish judge appointed to a certain region] would
have by his side one Serbian knez and without him the musallim could not judge an
Orthodox defendant. In Belgrade, twelve Serbian notables, one from each nahija, would
judge the Orthodox for serious offences such as murder. Hence, the pasha remained in
Belgrade and governed the Turks that mostly lived in the cities, while Milos governed the
non-Muslim population. Karadzic, “Milos Obrenovic”, p. 300.
16 Quoted in T. Stoianovich, “The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-
1880”, Comparative Studies in Society and History I, no. 3 (1959), p. 243.
17 M. Ekmecic, Stvaranje Jugoslavije, 1790-1918, Belgrade: Prosveta, 1989, p. 441.
18 The Turkish garrisons were restricted to the frontier fortresses and the taxes to the
Porte were to be paid annually in a lump sum. Importantly, the 1830 Hattiserif also tried to
limit Milos’ power with a clause that stipulated that the prince should “administer the
domestic affairs of the country in accord with the assembly of Serbian notables”. Prince
Milos paid no attention to this provision and continued with his autocratic rule. Stavrianos,
The Balkans since 1453, pp. 250, 252.
19 In 1831, Milos prohibited the Ottoman spahis [cavalry] from directly collecting taxes
from the peasants. Henceforth, the Serbian authorities collected taxes and then transferred
them to the Ottoman authorities of the principality. The Ottoman authorities in Belgrade
then paid each spahi his share of revenues. The prince also prohibited unpaid forced labour
on private estates, including those of Ottoman landlords. Thus, the Serbian bureaucracy
became the only official link between the peasants and the Ottoman authorities.
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In 1838, the Sublime Porte gave Serbia the so-called Turkish Constitution,
which introduced a separation of powers. Power was divided between the
Prince and the State Council, composed of seventeen members elected for life.
Two strong factions emerged as a result of this constitutional provision: one
oligarchic, the other princely.20 Until 1858 politics was played out between
these two centres of power.
The oligarchs called themselves the Defenders of the Constitution
(Ustavobranitelji). Garasanin became their most influential member. The
Defenders of the Constitution (henceforth, the Defenders) acquired that name
because they claimed that they were not opposed to Prince Milos Obrenovic
but were simply trying to defend the constitution.21 Most were livestock
traders, merchants, landowners and government officials.22 “None of the few
distinguished individuals who took power in the 1840s owned more than a few
hundred acres of land at most, none tried to trace their lineage to noble
forbears, none had aristocratic lifestyle, and none were more than barely
removed from their peasant background.”23
The separation of authority introduced by the Turkish Constitution
enabled Garasanin’s rise to influence. For thirty years, not counting three brief
retirements from state service,24 Garasanin had preponderant influence on
Serbia’s domestic and/or foreign policy during the reigns of both the
Karadjordjevic and Obrenovic dynasties.25 He was assistant minister of the
interior (1842-1843), and then minister of the interior (1843-1852); minister of
144 Edislav Manetovic
20 MacKenzie, Ilija Garasanin, p. 184.
21 Jovanovic, Ustavobranitelji, p. 25.
22 Hehn, “The Origins of Modern Pan-Serbism”, p. 153.
23 G. Stokes, “The Social Origins of East European Politics”, in D. Chirot (ed.), op. cit.,
p. 235.
24 The first time Garasanin left state service was in 1839, after Prince Mihailo Obrenovic’s
forces killed his father and brother, who were prominent participants of an aborted oligarch’s
rebellion against the prince. Garasanin fled to Wallachia where he engaged in trade. In 1842,
under constant pressure from the oligarchs who were embedded in the State Council, Mihailo
abdicated. The Karadjordjevic dynasty replaced the Obrenovic dynasty. That same year Prince
Alexander Karadjordjevic appointed Garasanin assistant minister of the interior. One year
later, in 1843, at the age of 31 Garasanin became minister of the interior.
25 Serbia had two royal families, the Karadjordjevic and the Obrenovic dynasties. The
former derived its authority from the First Serbian Uprising, the latter from the Second
Uprising. Milos Obrenovic ordered the killing of Karadjordje Petrovic on 25 or 26 July
1817. The Karadjordjevics ruled 1804-1813, 1842-1858, 1903-1945. The Obrenovics ruled
1813-1842, 1858-1903. See also notes 11 and 20. 
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foreign affairs (1852-1853); minister of the interior (1858-1859); prime minister
and foreign minister (1861-1867). He was not in state service only between
1853-1857 and 1859-1861. His final retirement came in 1867. However, even
after 1867 he influenced Serbian politics.26
Garasanin’s domestic and foreign policy views and actions should not be
separated. If primacy is to be given to one, it was his foreign policy
considerations that structured his domestic policies. The link between domestic
and foreign policy was best captured by Garasanin himself: “A nation’s
historical being is preconditioned by a natural necessity of having a state.
Without a state a man has neither life nor history. Because of that every human
action begins only with a state.”27
This thought clearly illustrates how he folded two distinct concepts –
nation and man – into one. It also portrays the central place a state has for
both. Garasanin’s concern with acquiring and securing state sovereignty for the
Serbian nation determined the content of his nationalism. Ultimately, this
strategy did make Serbia an international subject, but the population largely
remained an object to be acted upon by national élites.
The primacy Garasanin gave to inter-state considerations is most clearly
elaborated in his 1844 Nacertanije, which he wrote a year after he became
minister of the interior. The ideas expressed in it guided Garasanin’s policies
throughout his career. Nacertanije remained secret until 1906.28 It was known
only to a few personal friends of Garasanin, Prince Alexander Karadjordjevic,
later to Prince Mihailo Obrenovic, and Garasanin’s son.29 Because it was a
secret document it could not have had an impact on national consciousness at
the popular level.30 However, some scholars suggest that from the second half
of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of World War I, “leading political
groups and social strata in Serbia were thoroughly imbued with the ideas in the
Nacertanije and differed only in intensity of feeling and political
conceptualization”.31
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26 Ljusic, Knjiga o Nacertaniju, p. 130.
27 Quoted in Vrkatic, Pojam i bice srpske nacije, p. 98.
28 Austria acquired a copy of Nacertanije in 1883. The Serbian public was able to read
it for the first time in 1906. It was published in Delo, a journal close to the Radical Party of
Nikola Pasic. Vrkatic, Pojam i bice srpske nacije, p. 112.
29 MacKenzie, Ilija Garasanin, p. 56.
30 R. Ljusic, “Ilija Garasanin o srpskoj drzavnosti”, p. 155.
31 P. Hehn, “Modern Pan-Serbism”, p. 157.
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II. Garasanin’s Foreign and Domestic Policy: The State, Statism and
Illiberal Nationalism
In foreign policy, Garasanin was an exponent of Realpolitik. As a result his
biographer named him “the Balkan Bismarck” (MacKenzie, 1985). His views
on international politics were most clearly captured during the 1866 Prusso-
Austrian war when Bismarck, Paris and Serbian liberal opposition insisted that
Serbia join the Prussian coalition and start a war for independence and
unification with Bosnia. Garasanin, however, insisted on neutrality. As always,
he was cautious and skeptical. To one of his colleagues who insisted that Serbia
align itself with Prussia, Garasanin replied:
You don’t know anything! Do you believe that I don’t realize that with
the aid of the Granicari and Montenegrins, whom we can always count
upon, we could defeat the Turks? But who can guarantee that we
wouldn’t be pulling someone else’s chestnuts from the fire? The great
powers are now quarreling, but once they reconcile they will finish off
with us little ones. I will not go to war against Turkey until I have
ironclad guarantees that by such a war we will not be conquering Bosnia
for Austria.32
He was always skeptical about the intentions of great powers. Serbia had to first
and foremost protect its autonomy and only cautiously work to gain
independence: 
Independence is acquired not by foreign generosity, but by reason and
sacrifice. […] We will always accept [foreign aid] happily if it does not
obligate us. We must evaluate carefully foreign advice and promises of
material aid offered to us, accepting only that which in our judgment
will not hamper our independent action...33
Predatory great powers were one reason for prudence, the other was what
Clausewitz called the fog of war: 
Initiating a war is an easy thing, but extracting oneself from it is a most
difficult thing. No one can in advance say where and with how many
casualties a war will end. Hence, wisdom requires that all other means
must be first exhausted. Only when nothing else helps is it better to go
to war than to suffer tyranny and oppression.34
146 Edislav Manetovic
32 Quoted in MacKenzie, Ilija Garasanin, p. 283. See also I. Garasanin, Pisma: Ilije
Garasanina Jovanu Marinovicu od 4 jan. 1859 do 29 marta 1874, Vol. ππ, Belgrade: Srpska
kraljevska akademija, 1931, p. 159.
33 Quoted in MacKenzie, Ilija Garasanin, p. 320.
34 I. Garasanin, Pisma: Ilije Garasanina Jovanu Marinovicu od 29 marta 1848 do 31
dec. 1858, Vol. π, Belgrade: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1931, pp. 101-102.
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Garasanin never initiated a war although he prepared Serbia for a war all
along. Hence, the war for Serbia’s independence was deferred year after year.
Garasanin either thought the alignment of the great powers was unfavourable
– as for example after January 1863 when the Franco-Russian entente ended
due to the Polish revolt, or when later in 1863 Napoleon III entertained an idea
of giving Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria in return for Austrian cession of
Venetia to Italy. At other times Garasanin deferred action because either the
relationship between the Balkan peoples was not coordinated well enough or
because the interests of the Balkan actors were incompatible.35 Garasanin died
before Serbia acquired independence. However, he and Prince Mihailo
succeeded in early 1867 in negotiating the peaceful removal of all Turkish
garrisons from Serbia.
In November of 1867 Garasanin retired. He retreated to his house in a
village near Belgrade and remained there until his death in June 1874. In his
personal correspondence with like-minded officials he continued insisting that
the major threat to Serbia came from abroad. Only clear national goals
supplemented with an alliance of Balkan peoples could prevent foreign powers
from meddling in the region.36
Garasanin’s domestic politics were statist and illiberal.37 Garasanin alone
was not responsible for the development of a highly centralised Serbian
principality. Nonetheless, its centralised form did closely coincide with his
illiberal national ideology. His illiberal ideas were not informed by traditional
values but derived from concerns elaborated in Nacertanije. Those concerns
were best captured by Thucydides’ famous maxim, “the strong do what they
have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept”.38
Garasanin was committed to creating a strong Serbian state. Hence, in addition
to extending Serbia’s borders, which was Nacertanije’s central idea, Garasanin
also sought to increase Serbia’s power by concentrating all human and material
resources in the hands of the central government.
Serbia relatively quickly transitioned from being an Ottoman administered
province to becoming an indigenously ruled, highly centralised principality.
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35 MacKenzie, Ilija Garasanin, pp. 276-278, 300. On Serbia and the Balkan Alliance
System (1860-1868) see M. B. Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918, Vol. I,
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976, pp. 319-330.
36 Garasanin, Pisma, Vol. II, p. 219. See also MacKenzie, Ilija Garasanin, p. 376.
37 Statism is here defined as the domination of the state over individual members of the
society and the society as a whole.
38 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, London: Penguin Books, 1988, p.
402.
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During the transitional period Garasanin was at or near the helm of the
government. He consolidated Serbia’s police, army and state bureaucracy while
he was minister of the interior from 1843 to 1852.39 By 1846 Serbia had 4200
state bureaucrats. Most of its literate citizens, two percent of the entire
population, were employed by the state. While Garasanin was the prime
minister (1861-1867), his government was described as a compact team of
“hard working” and “meticulous” bureaucrats. The government held local
authorities under tight control. According to the Austrian consul to Belgrade,
in the 1860s Serbia became the most highly centralised country in Europe.40
During the period dominated by the Defenders (1838-1858) and later in the
1860s, some “civil rights, but no political rights were ensured to the citizens.
The Prince’s autocracy was limited with a resistant centre, but that centre was
not to be found in the people, rather that centre was the bureaucracy.”41 The
Defenders did however provide legal guarantees for the peasants’ property,
abolished all constraints on trade, introduced a Civil Code in 1844, organised
a separate judiciary, drastically expanded the educational system, and funded
higher education abroad, thus laying the foundation for the first native
intelligentsia.42 The Defenders’ and Garasanin’s long-term impact on Serbia
was that they initiated the creation of a new class, the state bureaucrats: “The
most coherent institution in [late nineteenth -and early twentieth-century]
Serbia, far richer, far more organized, and far better supported by ideological
justification than any other social organization...” The Defenders created a
strong bureaucracy based on the idea that the educated should administer the
state for the benefit of the Serbian nation.43
Where did this statist idea come from? According to Svetozar Markovic
(1846-1875), one of the first Serbian socialists and the most vigorous critic of
Serbia’s state-building process, statism was an outcome of a hierarchical
ordering of liberties. Ever since the First Serbian Uprising the Serbian élites
considered “external liberty”, independence, a precondition of “internal
liberty”, i.e. individual rights. His 1872 book entitled Srbija na istoku [Serbia
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on the East]44 was almost entirely devoted to explaining the relationship
between these two liberties in nineteenth-century Serbia:
I want to put forth a picture to the Serbian people of what the Serbian
revolution [the First and the Second Uprisings] brought to them and to
simultaneously show what they had but then lost. I also want to tell
them what they could have acquired in their state development, but
failed to acquire. By doing that I want to awaken those people that are
accustomed to think – to think a little and see that “freedom and unity”
of the Serbian nation should not mean that pasha is replaced by a
“prince” […], but rather that it should be understood as complete
liberation from authority and tyranny, liberation from intellectual and
material slavery.45
The diffusion of statism, or what Markovic called “the bureaucratic spirit”,
was the making of the Defenders. During the rule of the Defenders “the
concept of the government and the concept of the state were fused in popular
consciousness”. It is true, he continued, that even before Serbia acquired
autonomy the people submitted to the Ottomans. But that was a qualitatively
different kind of subordination. “[The Turks] had power and the people
considered subordination a necessity in light of violence, as something they had
to endure as long as they were weaker.”46 The Ottoman way of life was
different, they spoke a different language, they had a different religion, and
they considered the Serbian people as their property.47 In short, “there was a
deep social divide between the Serbs and the Turks...”48 In contrast, starting
with the Defenders the people began to be educated in the “bureaucratic
spirit”.49 They were taught “that submission to authorities was a major human
and national virtue and a precondition for national happiness”. From that
period springs the notion that citizens’ disobedience of the police and students’
disobedience of teachers was a “revolt against state order”.50
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Garasanin’s illiberal views were influenced by his analysis of the nation as
backward. Widespread illiteracy was not conducive to “internal liberties”. When
during the 1850s and 1860s liberals kept calling for freedom of the press,
ministerial responsibility and greater powers for the Assembly, Garasanin
countered by arguing that democratic reforms were “ridiculous for a country of
illiterate peasants”.51 Garasanin desired a “permanent and patriotic government”.
People were a “senseless multitude” only able to shout indiscriminately “Long
live!” or “Down with!”52
He did not change his views even after retirement. When in 1868 the
Regency of Jovan Ristic, the leader of the liberals, began talking about
transforming Serbia into a parliamentary monarchy and introducing freedom
of the press, Garasanin commented to a friend:
Today what is really good is considered bad. Only things that are
different are considered good, no matter what they really are. They want
to introduce the people into governance. That is a nice thing in general,
thus, it would be nice in our case as well but only if our people had a
better understanding of things. Now, all they know is to shout, “Hurrah
and long live!”53
Nonetheless, he thought about liberal reforms. At times he recommended
to his friend Jovan Marinovic that the new “forms” should be abolished, and at
other times he was more conciliatory. The Assembly was to be considered a
school whose results would be seen in the future.54
Social underdevelopment was just one source of his opposition to liberal
reforms. His conservative stance was further strengthened by a perception of a
threatening international environment that required unity. Factionalism led to
disunity and hence opened a window of opportunity for foreign interference.
“[T]he spirit of a faction [...] yields to foreign influence,” Garasanin
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maintained.55 This logic informed his thinking regardless of whether the anti-
government faction was autocratic or liberal.56
Garasanin even worried about factionalism within the Defenders. One
instance in 1848 encapsulates his thinking about factionalism and reveals the
underlying logic. When the revolutionary turmoil in Europe during 1848
threatened to split the Defenders into those who favoured more aggressive
actions for independence and those who opposed going to war, Garasanin
defended the latter option. In a letter to a colleague he explained why: 
I can see that you disapprove of my patchwork and prefer to tailor anew.
However, you lack a skilful tailor. When the old is not patched one can
easily remain naked. […] It is true that there is no justice without truth,
but believe me neither is there benefit without reason. When reason
does not lead, justice and truth will also break down.
Hence, he continued, “...if you take into consideration external threats and
domestic political divisions you will see that I am right.”57 The Defenders, he
constantly argued, “can always easily break up, but we are then simultaneously
breaking up our strength. Can that be useful?”58 Reason required unity because
unity was a source of strength. Survival in a Hobbesian inter-state system
demanded strength. In Nacertanije he explained how Serbia could be further
strengthened.
III. Retrospective Nationalism and Nacertanije
Garasanin’s Nacertanije is widely interpreted as either the first blueprint for
creating an exclusive Greater Serbia or as a programme of utopian Yugoslavism.59
While scholars differ as to what type of nationalism Garasanin espoused, almost
all assume that by 1844, the year when Nacertanije was written, inhabitants of
the Balkans had formed national identities.60 Some try to prove that the nations
Ilija Garasanin: Nacertanije and Nationalism 151
55 Quoted in MacKenzie, Ilija Garasanin, p. 31.
56 See Garasanin, Pisma, Vol. I, pp. 3-4, 85-6; MacKenzie, Ilija Garasanin, pp. 31, 214,
225.
57 I. Garasanin, Prepiska Ilije Garasanina, 1839-1849, Vol. I, Belgrade: Srpska akademija
nauka, 1950, p. 188.
58 Garasanin, Prepiska, p. 148.
59 For references see note 1.
60 Most notable exceptions are R. Paxton, “Nationalism and Revolution: A Re-Examination
of the Origins of the First Serbian Insurrection, 1804-1807”, East European Quarterly VI
(1972), pp. 337-362; G. Stokes, “The Absence of Nationalism in Serbian Politics Before 1840”,
Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism IV, no. 1, (1976/77), pp. 77-90; L. Meriage, “The
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 09:05:45 |
of former Yugoslavia date back to pre-modern times, others simply assume that
they do. Garasanin was a Serbian, not a Yugoslavist, nationalist. However, he was
also an inclusive, as opposed to exclusive, nationalist. This interpretation of
Garasanin may seem unlikely primarily to those who reject the notion that
nations are a relatively modern social phenomenon.61
Many scholars of the Balkans hold that national identities are much older
than modernity. Ivo Lederer, for example, noted that long before the
nineteenth century “the Serbs, in particular, through the oral tradition of epic
poetry and through the Serbian church maintained alive a sense of national
feeling”.62 Ivo Banac, another known historian, argued that in the case of Serbs,
Croats and Bulgarians “there is no question that the ability to distinguish
between one’s own national community and other national communities was
unimpaired, unambiguous, suprasocial, and – one might add – remarkably
accurate long before modern nationalism”.63 Bosniacs, Adil Zulfikarpasic
suggested, are descendents of the pre-Ottoman Bogomils who “accepted Islam
en masse and in a short period of time”.64
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These primordialist accounts spring from equating national identities with
other forms of group identities. Banac, for instance, acknowledges that “the
populus of medieval Croatia was the nobility, and its nationhood extended as far
as the state frontiers”.65 Obviously the term populus – Latin for “the people” –
did not have the same meaning in medieval times as it has today when class status
plays no role in who can be a Croat. Yet, Banac does not find it problematic to
equate the medieval conceptualisation of Croat nationhood with the modern
one. Moreover, even if the nobility of medieval Croatia had a national identity,
it is not clear that all nobles in Croatia identified with the same nation. The
nobility in medieval Croatia was “ethnically” mixed. Many inhabitants of
medieval Croatia spoke Hungarian or Italian,66 and not the Croatian language
that, according to Banac, is a defining attribute of nationhood. Language was a
fluid cultural trait in the pre-modern period and linguistic diversity coexisted
with regional and trans-Balkan functional lingua francas.67
An indication that national consciousness hardly pervaded all strata of
Croatian society was the nobility’s reaction to the abolition of serfdom in the
mid-nineteenth century. Since 1827, when the Hungarian Diet referred to
Croatia as a subject Hungarian land, the Croatian nobility lived in constant fear
that the Hungarian Diet would abolish feudalism and free the peasants. The
nobility of Croatia was not sympathetic to any type of emancipation.68
Although the nobility comprised four percent of the population of mid-
nineteenth-century Croatia and possessed three-quarters of the land,69 “the
Croatian nobles systematically fought the abolition of serfdom under the
pretext that they would be too impoverished to pay for hired labor on such
small holdings”.70
It is far from clear that the Croatian nation was forged before the Croatian
national movement. Ante Starcevic (1823-1896), known as the “Father of
Croatia” and the leader of the Party of Rights, was the first to conceptualise an
integral Croat national ideology and express an aspiration to full national
independence from the Habsburg Empire. Starcevic’s nationalism rested on the
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then popular “state rights” theory, according to which the further back in
history a nation can trace its roots, the more legitimate is its claim to the
territory. The right over Croatia by supposition belonged to the Croat “political
people” as far back as their migration to the Adriatic basin in the sixth century.
This “primary acquisition” established the eternal and natural Croat right to the
ownership of the land.71
Starcevic believed that the Croat nobility had lost all its exclusive rights in
favour of the people because the strictly nobles’ responsibility to defend the
homeland was transferred to the popularly based standing armies at the
beginning of the eighteenth century.72 What is important here is not the
eighteenth-century event to which Starcevic pointed, but Starcevic’s
articulation of an idea about a fraternal bond that connected all Croats. His
1871 Instructions to party members clearly indicate that the lower classes were
still not perceived as equal members of the national community and that he
intended to rectify that anomaly: “The peasantry and the lowest class of
townspeople on one side, and all the other classes on the other, are two inimical
groups in Croatia. Neither of them can achieve anything by itself, but in
harmony they are all-powerful. The party will weld those two large groups of
people and all their parts together.”73
Lederer’s suggestion that Serbian epic poetry and the Serbian Orthodox
Church played a crucial role in maintaining Serbian national identity from
medieval to modern times also deserves closer scrutiny since it is frequently
repeated. The evidence is far from conclusive. In the introduction to an
anthology of Serbian patriotic poetry, Zoran Gavrilovic suggested that Serbian
Romanticism of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries bridged the
almost three-centuries-long gap and established “continuity” between the
fifteenth-century Serbian culture and the modern Serbian culture. It is not clear
how much actual continuity there was in this rich oral tradition nor how much
this continuity was a creation of the Romantic period.74 Editors of another
collection of poems that were collected in the early nineteenth century raised a
similar question and concluded:
It is clear [...] that to a greater or lesser extent, each singing was a
compositional and not purely a recitational act, for each singer sang the
154 Edislav Manetovic
71 Banac, The National Question, pp. 85-86.
72 Banac, The National Question, p. 86.
73 Quoted in Dedijer et. al., History of Yugoslavia, p. 388.
74 Z. Gavrilovic (ed.), Antologija srpskog rodoljubivog pesnistva, XIV-XX vek, Belgrade:
Rad, 1967, p. 12.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 09:05:45 |
songs differently. So in a certain sense, regardless of the “age” of songs,
[the] early nineteenth-century folk songs, all of which, after having
passed on from generation to generation, had passed through the minds
and memories of their singers and had been reformed according to their
tastes or experience and in the vocabulary of their own cultures.75
The Serbian Church, as well as other autocephalous Orthodox churches,
also poses an interesting problem to scholars of national identities. The mere
fact that an independent Serbian Church was established in 1219 does not
affirm that a Serbian nation existed then. Orthodoxy’s unity, argues Paschalis
Kitromilides, was subverted only after its subjection to the expedients of
nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism.76 Indeed, the Church was
hostile to Vuk Karadzic’s 1815 grammar of the vernacular Serbian language and
his 1818 Serbian dictionary. The Church feared that the vernacular language
would turn Serbian loyalties away from Orthodox Russia.77
Vuk Karadzic, the first Serbian language reformer, died in Vienna in 1864.
He did not live to see the day when in 1868 the vernacular became officially
proclaimed the literary language. The government brought his remains to
Belgrade in September 1897. “It was a ceremony that was never before seen in
Belgrade. [...] Archbishop Mihailo led the dignitaries, the church bells were
tolling and fifty priests were chanting. In brief, the entire hierarchy that once
[...] despised his [language] reform” was present.78 The language that the
Church embraced until 1868 was Church Slavonic. “What profit have we from
a language which, taking our nation as a whole, not one person in ten thousand
understands properly and which is foreign to my mother and my sisters?” asked
Dositej Obradovic in 1783.79
The idea that the Bosnian Muslims are descendants of the medieval Bosnian
Christians – the Bogomils – is a no less problematic claim than the one
regarding the medieval roots of the Serbian and the Croatian nations. The
independent Bosnian Church, which was established in the thirteenth century
in schism with Rome, does not seem to have been dualist or Bogomil. It
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retained its basic Catholic theology throughout the Middle Ages and was
weakened before the advent of the Ottoman Muslims. Moreover, although the
Bosnian Church was under attack from the Vatican and Hungary, Bosnian
rulers and nobles of the three Christian denominations were largely indifferent
to religious issues; they intermarried and formed alliances as it suited their
worldly aims. In time the members of the Bosnian Church converted not only
to Islam, but also to Orthodoxy and Catholicism.80
The first and the clearest attempt to unite all Bosnian Muslims under a
common national ideology came in 1919 in the form of the Yugoslav Muslim
Organization (JMO). The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was
established one year before, in 1918. The JMO brought together Muslim landlords
and smallholders, Westernised intellectuals and traditionalist ulema, bazaar
merchants and urban poor. As in the case of Serb and Croat nationalist awakeners,
the rhetoric of equality figured prominently among Bosnian Muslim nationalists.
Reacting to the government’s programme of agrarian reform that jeopardised
Bosnian landlords, of whom Muslims made up 91 percent, Sakib Korkut, a leading
JMO activist, explicitly called in 1919 upon Muslims of all social standings to unite
in protection of their rights: “There are no class differences. Muslim peasant and
Muslim landlord feel the same way because neither has become dead to the
demands of justice and will not covet other people’s property...”81
A 1920 editorial in Pravda [Justice], JMO’s newspaper, implicitly acknowledged
that Bosnian Muslims did not yet have a firmly established national consciousness.
It explicitly suggested that nationalism was fundamentally a matter of rights; and
not just cultural rights, but economic and social ones as well:
The factors that have nowadays acquired the strongest role in nation-
forming are no longer religion or language, but economic and social
relations – that is material culture in general. [...] Should the Muslims
feel that they have had their fair chance at economic development, that
they can enjoy the same material culture as the Serbs, they will
unconditionally and certainly choose the Serb nationhood. But should
they continue to observe, as they have hitherto, that chances at
economic development are allotted unequally and that in their
inequality they are being equated with the Croats, they will, as before,
continue to choose Croat nationality.82
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Ultimately, Korkut noted, Bosnian Muslims had no other option but to
organise on the confessional basis and forge a national consciousness in which
Islam played a crucial role:
What did the national revolution [creation of first Yugoslavia in 1918]
bring us: fraternal forgiveness or savage retribution? I shall not recount
all the murders, robberies, and persecution of Muslims. [...] I shall only
note who committed these things: Orthodox Serbs. Some object,
noting that Catholic Croats were also persecuted. That is true. But that
only proves that the persecution of Muslims was not a result of our
“anational” circumstances. We were the victims of religious fanaticism
and were, therefore, forced to group ourselves on a religious basis, too.83
The preceding brief analysis strongly indicates that much more hard
empirical work is required before any conclusive judgments can be made about
the medieval origins of Bosniac, Croatian and Serbian national identities.
While the above-reviewed scholarship explicitly tries to date Bosniac,
Croatian and Serbian national identity to pre-modern times, the scholarship
dealing with Garasanin simply assumes their pre-modern origin. Because of
this implicit assumption they argue that Garasanin was either a utopian
Yugoslavist who wanted to fuse distinct nations into a new one or a Serbian
nationalist who wanted to dominate and/or assimilate other already formed
Balkan nations. 
The philosopher Mihailo Markovic, a disillusioned Yugoslavist turned
Serbian nationalist, asserts that Nacertanije is the source of Yugoslavia’s demise
and the underlying reason for Serbian defeats in the late 1990s. Markovic, a
former Partisan and then dissident intellectual with an impeccable reputation
as a neo-Marxian internationalist, became in 1990 vice-president of Slobodan
Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia.84 For Markovic there were two ideas that
predated the creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The
first was the Yugoslavist idea that aimed to unite all South Slavs in a single state.
The second idea favoured creating a Serbian state that would encompass only
Serbs. According to Markovic, the Yugoslav idea was clearly “rooted” in
Nacertanije.85 The main problem with the so-called first and the second
Yugoslavia was that only Serbs and Montenegrins were willing to forge a new
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Yugoslav national identity while others “jealously guarded their separate
national identities and their so-called ‘historical’ rights”. They joined
Yugoslavia for “primarily pragmatic” reasons.86 Markovic overlooked that
favouring a Yugoslavist idea so that all Serbs could live in one state was also
pragmatic. This was, after all, his interpretation of why Garasanin embraced
Yugoslavism. He noted that Garasanin embraced Yugoslavism because he
understood that Serbs could secure their existence in a single political unit only
if Serbia liberated all other South Slavs. Markovic concludes that historical
experience proved that the ideas expressed in Nacertanije were a failure.87
Some Serbian scholars who are critical of Serbian nationalism, past or
contemporary, also implicitly subscribe to the idea that nations are pre-modern
phenomena. Analysing, inter alia, Garasanin and Nacertanije in a study
entitled The Concept and the Nature of the Serbian Nation, Lazar Vrkatic tries
to answer the following question, “What was it that made the [Serbian]
population feel as one nation?” He concludes that it was neither language nor
religion but shared mythology.88 Whether it was mythology or something else
is less relevant; what is indicative is that his conclusion implies that during the
1840s, when Garasanin was writing Nacertanije, the content of Serbian and
Bosniac national consciousness had already been forged. According to Vrkatic,
Garasanin held that the state “was the only important attribute of nationhood
[…] He did not even see an obstacle for incorporating the Bosnians of Catholic
faith into the Serbian nation.”89 Hence, Vrkatic asserts, “The spirit of
Garasanin is the most lethal Serbian weapon; it is lethal for others, but also for
themselves.”90
Just like Markovic and Vrkatic, Croatian scholars also assume that Serbs and
Croats had formed national identities in the 1840s and, most probably, many
centuries before. Their decontextualised reading of Nacertanije also indicates
why Nacertanije is so infamous among Serbia’s neighbours.
In 1944, during the last years of World War II when Tito’s multinational
Partisan resistance movement was fighting against the Nazi occupiers and their
collaborators from all South Slav nations, Petar Simunic wrote Nacertanije: The
Secret Text of Serbian National and Foreign Policy. The very first paragraph
reflects the purpose of the analysis as well as the significance of Garasanin’s
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Nacertanije. 1944 marks one century since Garasanin handed Nacertanije to the
Serbian Prince, Simunic writes, and since this text “has special significance for
Serbian expansionism and Serbian political thought towards the Croats, I am
laying down its meaning, content and its guiding thoughts.”91 Almost five
decades later, in 1992, when Serbs and Croats were engaged in a civil war,
Simunic’s book was reprinted. In a long forward to the new edition, Mirko
Valentic reminds the readers how Garasanin’s Nacertanije and Simunic’s
interpretation of it was still pertinent for understanding Serbia’s policies towards
its neighbours. The work of Petar Simunic, writes Valentic, is being reprinted,
[A]t the time when the Croatian people, after so many centuries, are
finally seeing the end of the tunnel. Simunic’s book is still useful
because its analysis and its recommendations have not lost any of its
relevance. [...] It remains the standard work for understanding the
relations between Croatia and Serbia. […] The genesis of Great Serbian
aggression on all non-Serbian lands and peoples was programmatically
formed in the 1844 Nacertanije…92
Ever since Nacertanije, the Serbian policy had “ideationally and
programmatically” remained the same.93
In 1994, a Croatian historian, Damir Agicic, published The Secret Policy of
Serbia in the Nineteenth Century. Like Simunic and Valentic, Agicic concludes
that the: 
[G]reater Serbian character of the secret policy conducted by the
Serbian political leadership since the mid-nineteenth century is entirely
clear when one knows that the ultimate goal was expanding Serbia’s
borders, imposing the Serbian dynasty, its legal and political system.
Serbia largely succeeded in its intentions after World War I. Serbia tried
to achieve something similar later, and is currently still trying to achieve
the same goal.94
Drawing parallels between nineteenth- and twentieth-century Serbian
policies is problematic for it decontextualises policies from their social context.
Understanding Nacertanije requires placing it in a historical context and in the
context of Garasanin’s overall ideas on national and international politics. His
views in regard to the national question were not as out of step from historical
Ilija Garasanin: Nacertanije and Nationalism 159
91 P. Simunic, Nacertanije: Tajni spis srpske nacionalne i vanjske politike, Zagreb:
Globus, 1992 [1944], p. 5.
92 M. Valentic (ed.), “Predgovor”, in P. Simunic, Nacertanije, p. ii.
93 Valentic, “Predgovor”, p. ii.
94 D. Agicic, Tajna politika Srbije u XIX. stoljecu, Zagreb: AGM, 1994, p. 111.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 09:05:45 |
circumstances as his twentieth-century critics assume. In the mid-nineteenth
century nationalist movements were just emerging and placing seeds for
nations-to-be. Locating the 1844 Nacertanije within the context of a still-
emerging sense of national belonging offers a more nuanced understanding of
Garasanin and Nacertanije. It also explains why the strong centralised
principality he managed to forge attracted some South Slavs even during his life. 
IV. Nacertanije: Insecurity, Size and Inclusion
In a letter written four years after Nacertanije Garasanin succinctly explained
why Serbia had to enlarge its borders. It had little to do with Yugoslavism or
Greater Serbian nationalism and much to do with insecurity. Security
considerations, in turn, required policies that were inclusive, albeit selectively.
Serbia cannot rely on the mercy of others, Garasanin noted. She must
“determine her own role”. Although the state of “Serbia will not perfectly
secure the nation by unifying with other Slavs, she will have to do it since she
cannot secure it otherwise”.95 This was the underlying idea elaborated in
Nacertanije.
Nacertanije was a revised version of a programme proposed to Garasanin by
Paris-based Polish and Czech immigrants. In 1843, Polish émigré leader, Prince
Adam Czartoryski, sent a Czech nationalist, Frantisek Zach, to Belgrade as his
envoy. Their main aim was to assess the situation in the principality and devise
a way to prevent Russian or Austrian influence. These considerations
necessitated that Serbia not initiate a war of independence since that could have
instigated the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Only Russia and Austria could
have benefited from such a situation. Serbia was to restrict herself to
coordinating South Slav cooperation for the purpose of forging a South Slav
state at some point in the future. Such a state was to obstruct Russia’s
southward expansion. Zach conveyed to Garasanin that the South Slavs had
three options. They could fall under Russian domination; they could become a
Turkish protectorate; or, they could rebel and suffer the consequences of a
Russian and/or Austrian intervention.96 Placing herself at the head of Turkish
Slavs, Serbia had to prevent the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire.97
In early 1844 Zach returned to Belgrade and gave Garasanin a document
entitled “The Plan”. It was a written version of what Zach conveyed to
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Garasanin in 1843. Garasanin made a number of changes to “The Plan”. Most
indicative for the purpose of this analysis were three. First, throughout the text
he replaced the word “Yugoslav” with “Serb” without “expressly rejecting Zach’s
assertion that Serbia in its own interest must pursue a Yugoslav policy”.98
Second, he omitted the section on Croatia. Third, he flatly rejected the negative
view of Russia. He wrote in Nacertanije :
With no one else can Serbia achieve her goal more easily than in
agreement with Russia, but only if Russia fully and completely accepts
Serbia’s conditions, guaranteeing her future in the broadest terms. An
alliance between Serbia and Russia would be truly the most natural, but
whether it will be achieved depends on Russia, and Serbia would
welcome it with open arms, but only if she is convinced that Russia is
proposing it sincerely and heartily which can only be the case if she
[Russia] renounces her present system [of intervention] and realizes that
an alliance with little Serbia is more natural than one with Austria.99
He concluded those thoughts on Russia by noting, “Although I doubt that
Russia will ever want to honestly ally herself with Serbia, it is imperative to
mention this here because it would be of great interest to Serbia…”100
The overarching purpose of Nacertanije was laid out in the first five
introductory paragraphs (19-20).101 The very first sentence of the text states
that, “Serbia must place herself in the ranks of other European states by
creating a plan for her future or establishing, so to speak, principles for a long-
term domestic policy to which she should firmly adhere.” All subsequent
recommendations spring from the assessment that Serbia was “small” and that
to secure her future she must not remain small. Serbia, Garasanin wrote, could
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enlarge herself through an alliance with her neighbours and by incorporating
all Serbs into that state: 
If Serbia assesses well enough what she is now, in what position she is
and who are the peoples that surround her, she will realise that she is
very small, that she must not remain in such a condition, and that only
through alliance with other neighbouring peoples and with a clear
purpose can she ensure her future. The plan and the foundation of
Serbian politics derive from this recognition: that she not limit herself
to her present borders, but to endeavour to attach to her all the
neighbouring Serbian peoples.
The concluding paragraph of the introduction reaffirms that Garasanin’s
primary goal was strengthening Serbia through enlargement and that this was
required because of the Hobbesian international system: “If Serbia does not
vividly pursue this policy and, worse still, if she rejects it, she will be buffeted
to and fro like a small vessel by alien tempests until finally she will be broken
into pieces on some huge reef.”
Serbia had to take into consideration three factors in order to successfully
achieve these goals: (1) the imminent collapse of the Ottoman Empire; (2) geo-
strategic interests of European great powers; and (3) the identity of the
population that surrounds her.
The Ottoman Empire must collapse, he held. It will either be partitioned
or it will be “rebuilt anew by its Christian inhabitants”. Garasanin favoured the
latter option. He saw Serbia’s thirteenth- and fourteenth-century empire as a
“solid and constant historical foundation” upon which a new “Serbian-Slavic
Empire” could be built:
It is known from […] history that the Serbian rulers began to assume
the position held by the Greek Empire. They almost succeeded in
displacing the collapsing Eastern Roman Empire with a Serbian-Slavic
Empire. The Greek Empire’s coat-of-arms was even given to Emperor
Dusan the Mighty. The arrival of the Turks in the Balkans interrupted
this enterprise […]. Now that the Turkish power is broken and almost
destroyed, the same spirit should be revived. [Serbia should] claim its
rights anew and continue the interrupted enterprise (21-22).
Garasanin’s plans for Serbia were ambitious but not unrealistic, he thought.
Geo-strategic interests of France and England were compatible with these goals.
Replacement of the Ottoman Empire with a Serbian-Slavic one would be
useful for both England and France. Otherwise, if the Ottoman Empire simply
disintegrated, Austria and Russia would “easily agree” how to divide the
Ottoman lands among themselves. “It is natural that all other powers, under
162 Edislav Manetovic
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 09:05:45 |
the leadership of France and England, are opposed to the expansion and
enlargement of Russia and Austria.” Moscow and Vienna were already working
“in every way to forestall and prevent the emergence of another Christian
empire in place of the Ottoman”. Russia did not want it, because “then, the
fond hope and pleasant prospect would disappear for Russia of seizing and
holding Constantinople, which has been her most cherished plan since Peter
the Great”. The Habsburg Empire did not want it because, “Austria would then
be in a terrifying danger of losing her South Slavs” (20-22).
Geo-strategic interests of France and England were not a sufficient reason
for them to support Serbia’s expansion. Serbia had to guarantee to them that
she will be “a distinguished and a robust state capable of maintaining herself
between Austria and Russia”. Serbia also had to justify the plan by invoking her
“sacred historical right”. This would be useful for two reasons. First, European
powers would not be able to interpret Serbia’s aspirations “as something novel
and unfounded, as a revolution and a coup”. Rather, all would have to
acknowledge that Serbian aspirations were “grounded in ancient ages”. The
second reason why invoking historical rights was useful had to do with other
South Slavs. “[O]ther South Slavs will easily understand this idea and accept it
with joy” too. Since “the memory of the past [is] so vivid […] among the Slavs
of Turkey […], it is certain that this enterprise will be readily accepted by the
people” (22-23).
Finally, the identity of the people that were to be integrated into the
prospective empire had to be taken into consideration. “Movement and
agitation among the Slavs has already begun.” Serbia had to “understand this
movement” and define the “role [...] she will have in it” (23). Deciding on
appropriate means for implementing Serbia’s enlargement required first
assessing the condition in which the people residing in the Habsburg and the
Ottoman provinces lived. Serbian “agents” were to be sent to assesses the
political and military conditions, gather useful information about the
population, their feelings, desires and martial spirit. Finally, Garasanin found it
important for the Serbian government to know “the attitude of people in each
province toward Serbia and their expectations from her, [...] along with what
they want from Serbia or why they fear her” (24).102
Garasanin did not have a single strategy for all neighbouring provinces.
After explaining the global circumstances in which Serbia had to act, he
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devoted most of Nacertanije to specific regions of the Ottoman and Habsburg
empires. He first discussed Bulgaria. The section on Bulgaria is followed by a
section entitled “On the policy of Serbia towards Bosnia, Herzegovina,
Montenegro and Northern Albania”. The next section is on the Habsburg lands
(“Srem, Backa and Banat”), and, lastly, he introduced a brief section on the
Czechs (“On Alliance with the Czech Slavs”).103
Juxtaposing Garasanin’s thoughts on Bulgaria with those on Bosnia and
other South Slav inhabited lands reveals the form of international relations he
envisioned for the prospective state. In short, he had a dual strategy: assimilation
and alliance. Some peoples’ national identities were to be recognised while
others were to be assimilated into the Serbian nation. Enlargement required a
combination of approaches. He did not explain the logic behind different
strategies. However, the appropriate strategy seems to have depended on
whether Garasanin thought a society in question had or did not have a national
identity. Hence, the non-national Catholic and Muslim South Slav population
was to be assimilated into the Serbian nation. In contrast, the nationally
conscious Bulgarian population was recognised as a distinct nation.
Based on what criteria did Garasanin decide whether a certain population
had a national identity? One may tentatively conclude that the criteria were
based on what he deemed were attributes of a nation – “common origin, and a
shared language” (23). As will be noted later, these were the same attributes that
the Illyrians and then the Yugoslavists held to define a nation. Aside from this
similarity, there was also a crucial difference between them. They believed the
South Slavs were one Illyrian/Yugoslavian nation. Garasanin most probably
held that they were, or could all become, Serbs. Like the Illyrians and the
Yugoslavists, he considered religious differences to be an obstacle to forging a
shared national identity. However, since religion was not an attribute of
nationality it was not deemed an insurmountable obstacle. Religious
differences, the one overarching ascriptive characteristic that created a social
cleavage in the region, had to be managed. The solution he found was freedom
of religion. Freedom of religion was to be respected in his prospective state. 
Before turning his attention to the lands that were in 1918 incorporated
into the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Garasanin devoted six
pages out of a twenty-page-long manuscript to Bulgaria. Bulgaria was
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important for two reasons: first, because “Bulgaria is the closest of all the Slavic
countries to the glorious capital of the Ottoman Empire...”; and, second,
because Bulgaria was the country in which Serbian and Russian “influences
must primarily and largely come into contact” (29). Hence, given the
importance of Bulgaria to both Russian and Serbian imperial interests, the
strategy toward Bulgaria necessitated particular attention. Istanbul’s control of
Bulgaria was so tight “that a greater effort for its liberation from Turkish yoke
is still far away” (30). The Bulgarians had no confidence in their own strength
and acted only when nudged by Russia (26). Given that Russian and Serbian
interests in Bulgaria were incompatible and that Russian influence in Bulgaria
was substantial, Serbia had to act promptly:
If for only a few more years Russia continues acting in Bulgaria the way
she has been acting lately, and if Serbia lets her act without doing
anything, then Russia will indeed achieve such success that Serbian
influence in Bulgaria will become useless […] Serbia must do
something for Bulgaria because love and help need to be mutual (30).
Serbia had to help Bulgaria in the 1840s so that at some future point in time
Bulgaria would become a constitutive part of the Serbian-Slavic Empire. Never
let Serbia “forget that political friendship may be expected only if we have
previously showed and proved our love for a friend” (30). 
The “means for establishing Serbian influence” in Bulgaria were described
briefly. The overall objective was to reinforce a distinct Bulgarian identity. The
means included providing educational services to Bulgarians, strengthening
Bulgarian as opposed to Greek clergy, and printing Bulgarian ecclesiastical and
secular literature.104 Hence, although the future empire was not to be known
by the Bulgarian name, Garasanin did not see Bulgarian national identity as an
obstacle. Rather, preserving Bulgarian national consciousness was his goal.
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This conclusion is further supported by the ideas he expressed many years
later in a somewhat different context. In a “Memoir to Myself ” of May 1867,
Garasanin expressed his views in regard to the Balkan League – an alliance of
Balkan nations which was organised, inter alia, by Garasanin in order to
overthrow the Ottomans. There he noted that the Bulgarians, Greeks,
Romanians and Serbs had to treat each other as equals. In addition to equality,
Garasanin noted, those nations also had to make mutual concessions on
frontiers just as Italy had sacrificed Savoy and Prussia had abandoned
Luxembourg.105
That same year, when the envoys of the Bulgarian Voluntary Society
approached him with a plan of liberation and unification, Garasanin was even
prepared to change the name of the prospective country in order to
accommodate their wishes. In 1867 Garasanin and the Serbian government
accepted the proposal of the Bulgarian Voluntary Society. According to that
programme, “brotherly” Serbian and Bulgarian nations would unite in a state
known as the Yugoslavian Empire. The empire would be a dual monarchy with
a common ruler, Tsar Mihailo Obrenovic. The two languages would be equal.
“Each side will preserve its dialect and because of that, state officials must be
from the nation where they serve. [...] All official documents of the Yugoslavian
Empire must, without exception, be published in both dialects, the Serbian and
the Bulgarian simultaneously.”106
The substantive section of Nacertanije dealing with Bulgaria is frequently
overlooked at peril for those scholars who see in it a Greater Serbia programme
that would Serbianise all its inhabitants. Security in the nineteenth century
required a large state, an empire, and if creating one necessitated recognising
other nations Garasanin was prepared to consider that arrangement. Those
scholars who interpret Nacertanije as a Yugoslavist multi national project are no
less wrong. Garasanin’s ideas on Bosnia and subsequent negotiations with the
Illyrians and Yugoslavists indicate that his and their views differed substantially.
Garasanin was most detailed in his treatment of Bosnia. He emphasised that
Serbia had to focus “particularly” on Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and
North Albania (24-25).107 The reason was that unification with Bosnia was to
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be the first, and the most imminent, step toward “general unification of all
Serbs and [Ottoman] provinces” (33).
In contrast to Bulgaria, Serbian policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina had
the goal of preventing the emergence of a distinct national identity. He seemed
uncertain how to categorise the inhabitants of Bosnia. His uncertainty is
apparent from different terms he used. Referring to inhabitants of Bosnia he
wrote about the “neighbouring nation” (31); about “two nations” of Catholic
and Orthodox faith (without mentioning those of the Islamic faith) (32); about
“both parts of the nation residing” in Bosnia, referring again to the Bosnian
Orthodox and Catholic population (32); about the principle of “unity of
nationalities” that should bind Serbia and Bosnia (33); about “Bosniacs”
(Bosnjaci) when referring to all Bosnian inhabitants (33, 34, 35, 37).
One can, however, infer with some confidence that he saw all the
inhabitants of Bosnia as sharing with the Serbs from Serbia a common origin
and language. Given that origin and language defined one’s nationality (23),
even if Garasanin did not see all the Bosnian inhabitants having a Serbian
national identity, it follows from his membership criteria that with wise Serbian
policies they would come to feel as Serbs.
Accomplishing that required adherence to three “basic principles”. Two
principles were geared towards attracting the Bosnian population to Serbia. The
third was to ensure assimilation of Bosnians into the Serbian nation. His
primary concern were Bosnian Catholics, not Bosnian Muslims. Hence, he
called for reaching “an agreement about national policy” between the Orthodox
and the Catholics. He hoped, however, that eventually Bosnian Muslims would
come on board as well. The agreement between the Catholics and the Orthodox
was to be established on “the principle of complete freedom of religion”. “This
principle,” Garasanin wrote, “will be appreciated and will satisfy all Christians,
perhaps it will become accepted by some Muslims as well” (32). 
In addition to respecting religious diversity, the principle of “unity of
nationalities” also had to guide Serbian policy. What he meant by “unity of
nationalities” was that the Principality of Serbia and its “diplomatic
representative” had to “protect” and “assist” Bosnians and other Slavs:
Serbia […] must realise that she is a natural protector of all the Slavs
living in Turkey, and that other Slavs will only concede her that right
when she takes upon herself the duty of doing and saying something in
their name. If Serbia sets bad and unfortunate examples by being
indifferent to her neighbours, if she thinks only of herself without
caring about the troubles or advancement of others, then they will
certainly follow her example and will not listen to her. Thus, harmony
and unity would be replaced by distrust, envy and misfortune (33-34).
Ilija Garasanin: Nacertanije and Nationalism 167
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 09:05:45 |
Garasanin was not only concerned with attracting the population of Bosnia by
guaranteeing religious freedoms and offering diplomatic protection to its
inhabitants. He showed keen awareness that institutional arrangements were
important for shaping national identities.108 Political unity was to be achieved
through a political system that would institute a hereditary monarch. This was the
third and final principle of Serbian policy toward Bosnia. “This principle is the
very embodiment of state unity. An enduring and permanent state union between
Serbia and her neighbours is unthinkable without it” (32). An “inevitable
consequence”, of not having a hereditary ruler, “would be fragmentation of
Serbdom into provincial, small principalities under separate ruling families who
would doubtless quickly fall under the sway of foreign influences because there
would arise rivalry and envy between them” (32). He did not write explicitly that
the hereditary ruler was to be Serbian, but there is little doubt that the monarch
of the prospective state was intended to be Serbian.
It is worth noting that pre-unification Bosnia was to have a political
arrangement that was diametrically opposed to the one he proposed for the
common state. Before unification Bosnia was not to have a single hereditary
ruler. The reason was that a Bosnian hereditary ruler would be an obstacle to
the future union with Serbia. It was to be recommended to Bosnia, Garasanin
wrote, that it institute a “council” composed of “the most important men”. The
members of the council were not to be elected for life. Although such a
government would be “divided and provincial”, he noted it would enable
“Serbia to eventually bring about a closer union with Bosnia” (33). 
A number of “means” would achieve the goal of integrating Bosnia. The
main difference between the policies towards Bulgaria and Bosnia was that in
Bosnia the “means” were geared towards reinforcing similarities with the Serbs.
They ranged from measures such as opening borders in order to facilitate
communication between Bosnia and Serbia to accepting young Bosnians into
Serbian state service “so that later these officials could apply in their own
homeland what they have learned in Serbia” (31, 34). Other measures were
specifically crafted to “educate” young Bosnians “in such a manner that their
work becomes completely imbued by the redeeming idea of a general
unification and great advancement”. Hence, Garasanin proposed printing “a
short and comprehensive history of Bosnia” and other “patriotic works”. Those
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studies were to be written by a “capable and deeply discerning person”. The
history texts on Bosnia were not to omit “the names and glory […] of several
Bosnians who had converted to Muslim faith. It goes without saying,” he went
on, “that this history should be written in the spirit of the Slavic nationality and
entirely in the spirit of the national unity of Serbs and Bosnians” (34).109
Garasanin devoted only two sentences to the Orthodox population of
Bosnia, probably because he held that influencing the “Eastern Orthodox
Bosniacs” would be least difficult (37). Interestingly, he did suggest that
liturgical books and anthologies of popular poems for the Orthodox were to be
printed in both Latin and Cyrillic alphabets (34).
The section on Bosnia and Herzegovina also dealt briefly with Northern
Albania and with Montenegro. Northern Albania and Montenegro were
important because they “hold the keys to the gates of Bosnia and Herzegovina”
(38). Union with them was also important for economic, military and national
reasons. Since “the entire foreign trade of Serbia is in the hands of Austria”,
Serbia had to search for other trade routes. That “distressing affair” necessitated
access to the sea. “For the present, the only route possible is the one which leads
through Skadar [Scutari] to Ulcinj.” Hence, as a first step Serbia had to appoint
a “commercial agent to Ulcinj” (35).
While he elaborated at some length on the economic and the strategic
importance of Northern Albania and Montenegro for Serbia, Garasanin
seemed least concerned with their identity. He considered them to be Serbs.
Given that the commercial agent would be “among a Serbian population”, he
wrote, the establishment of the agency would be understood by them as a
political act of immeasurable importance. A closer union of the people of those
provinces with Serbia would be an easy matter (36).110
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The section of Nacertanije on Srem, Backa and Banat was barely half a page
long and clearly indicated that Garasanin did not want to raise suspicion
among the Habsburgs, who ruled those areas. His thoughts on Srem, Backa
and Banat – regions that after World War I became parts of Serbia – perhaps
best reflect the fine balance Garasanin tried to strike between national ideals
and global political constraints. Although he considered them to be the “same
with the Serbs of Serbia” because they had the same origin, language, religion,
law and customs, his recommendations were very unimposing. “For the
present, if nothing else, at least an effort should be made to become acquainted
with the most important figures in these provinces and to establish one
important newspaper which could, respecting the Hungarian Constitution, be
useful to the Serbian cause…” The best Serbia could do was to “keep proving
that it is a well organised, strong, just and an enlightened state” (38-39).
The original document submitted to Garasanin by Zach included a section
on Croatia. Garasanin left Croatia entirely out of Nacertanije. Some suggest
that he did so because he did not agree with Zach’s treatment of Croatia as an
equal to Serbia. Others argue that the reason was fear of provoking Vienna.111
Whatever the reason may have been, Garasanin’s subsequent policies toward
Croatia indicate that he did not treat Croatia in the same manner he treated
Bulgaria. Inhabitants of Croatia, like those of Bosnia, were to be assimilated
into the Serbian nation. At that time the nationalist movement in the South
Slav lands of the Habsburg Empire was the Illyrian movement (1830-1848).
Illyrians envisioned an Illyrian nation that would include both Croats and
Serbs.112 Since an integral Croatian national movement was just emerging, it is
not too surprising that Garasanin did not recognise the existence of a Croatian
nation.113
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111 Ekmecic, Stvaranje Jugoslavije, p. 369.
112 Ljudevit Gaj, the leader of the Illyrian national movement, believed that the Habsburg
territories inhabited by the South Slavs were not populated by a homogeneous community.
However, while recognising their cultural heterogeneity, Gaj did not hold that Serbs and
Croats were yet formed national communities. For instance, although in 1839 he writes: “[A]
Serb will never become a Croat..., and the latter can never become a Serb,” he also adds a
thought which indicates his Illyrian nationalism: “It is not our intent to abolish the separate
names, but to only adjoin them under a common national name.” Quoted in  Lj. Ciric-
Bogetic and M. Djordjevic, Iz politicke istorije jugoslovenskih narod - XIX i XX vek, Belgrade:
Privredni pregled, 1975, p. 8.
113 The first political party with a Croat national programme was pro-Hungarian and
anti-Illyrian. Formed in 1841, the Croato-Hungarian Party had in its programme the
suppression of Illyrianism. However, the nationalism of the Croato-Hungarian Party was, as
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Until July 1848 Garasanin supported Ljudevit Gaj (1809-1872), the leader
of the Illyrians. He supported Gaj not because he shared his national ideals but
because Gaj’s vision of creating a state for the Illyrians was somewhat
compatible with Garasanin’s imperial ambitions. In 1848, Garasanin wrote to
the president of the State Council about his discussions with Gaj’s envoys. He
noted that Gaj wanted to create a South Slav kingdom with Serbia as its centre.
Garasanin agreed to help Gaj’s cause financially because Gaj was a
counterbalance to the Ban of Croatia. Gaj’s “influence” had to be supported
given that the Ban of Croatia did not want to create an independent state but
was satisfied with strengthening Croatia’s autonomy within the Habsburg
Empire.114 In July 1848, Garasanin terminated his support for Gaj, because
Garasanin acquired information suggesting that he was a “Russian man”.115
In the 1860s, with the demise of Bach’s absolutism, the Illyrian ideals
reemerged in the guise of the Yugoslav national movement.116 The Catholic
Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905), a proponent of Liberal
Catholicism,117 led the Yugoslavist movement.118 Garasanin’s relations with
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the name of the party itself indicates, not yet clearly defined. Lederer, “Nationalism and the
Yugoslavs”, p. 415. As I suggested earlier, only with Ante Starcevic (1823-1896) and Eugen
Kvaternik (1825-1871) were the Croatian interests defined in purely Croatian terms.
Tellingly, both men were embittered former Illyrians. Lederer, “Nationalism and the
Yugoslavs”, p. 420.
114 Garasanin, Prepiska, p. 150.
115 Garasanin, Prepiska, pp. 238-239, 246. It seems, however, that Garasanin was wrong.
Gaj was closer to Vienna than to Russia. In 1846 Gaj told the Czech Frantisek Zach that he
was cooperating with Metternich and received from him financial support. M. Ekmecic,
“Evropska pozadina Nacertanija Ilije Garasanina 1844”, in Z. Konstantinovic and S.
Pavicevic (eds), Garasanin: Susreti i vidjenja, 2001, Kragujevac: Jefimija, 2002, p. 68.
116 By 1843 Vienna recognised that the Illyrian movement was subverting the monarchy
and Metternich outlawed the use of the Illyrian name and symbols. Ciric-Bogetic and
Djordjevic, Iz politicke istorije, pp. 8-9. The introduction of Bach’s absolutism, in 1848,
marked the end of the Illyrian movement.
117 Liberal Catholicism rose with the French Revolution. It marries the idea of Christianity
with the idea of social revolution. Among the South Slavs, Liberal Catholicism spread the
notion that the Orthodox Christian Church was not an enemy (dusmanin) but only an
alternative religion. Ekmecic, Stvaranje Jugoslavije, pp. 372, 379.
118 Strossmayer laboured diligently on disseminating Yugoslavism among the Habsburg-
governed South Slavs. R. L. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1974, p. 77. Like Gaj, Strossmayer held that Herder’s ideas about “freedom
through culture” could be fulfilled if only a single South Slav identity could be created.
Lampe, Yugoslavia, p. 58.
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Strossmayer strongly indicate that he did not hold that Croatia was to be equal
to Serbia in any prospective state. It is also clear that Strossmayer ultimately
conceded primacy to Serbia.
In 1867, Garasanin and Strossmayer began working on a blueprint for
liberating Bosnia. Garasanin and Strossmayer’s confidant Oreskovic worked
together on a document entitled “Programme of Yugoslav policy proposed by
Garasanin to Strossmayer”. Oreskovic wrote the draft of the document.
Revisions made by Garasanin clearly indicate what type of relations with
Croatia Garasanin wanted. In sum, Garasanin’s revisions toned down the parts
that emphasised equality of Serbs and Croats in the prospective common state.
Oreskovic’s draft stated that “[t]his state will be organised internally on purely
Slav bases, i.e. local administrative autonomy combined with a centralised
government in which leading figures from all peoples will participate equally”.
Garasanin replaced Oreskovic’s concrete formulation with a much more open-
ended one. The new state was still to be a “federated state”, but the statement
on equality between the two peoples was crossed out by Garasanin:
“Organisation of this state will be left to time and to the participating peoples
after liberation is achieved.”
Another revision that Garasanin made is just as telling. Garasanin retained
Oreskovic’s formulation of Serbia’s Piedmontist role: “Belgrade, having its
independent government and all military resources at its disposal, is the natural
centre for diplomatic and military activity.” However, Garasanin changed the
very next sentence. Originally it read: “Thus [Belgrade] will direct all this work
always in agreement with Zagreb.” Garasanin revised it by deleting reference to
Zagreb. The final version read: “Thus, it [Belgrade] will direct all this work.”
Strossmayer accepted Garasanin’s revisions, which also included a statement
that Serbia would annex Bosnia as a first step toward unification.119
It is important to note that negotiations with Strossmayer were taking place
in 1867, the same year when Garasanin was approached by the Bulgarian
Voluntary Society with a plan to create a dual monarchy. That plan Garasanin
accepted. Those that claim that Garasanin was a Yugoslavist cannot explain
why he rejected Strossmayer’s initiative and at the same time accepted the
Bulgarian plan. Those that claim that Garasanin was an exclusive Serbian
nationalist cannot explain the latter. His behaviour acquires coherence only if
we treat Garasanin as a Serbian nationalist, not a Yugoslavist, and as an
inclusive, not as an exclusive, nationalist.
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Conclusion
Both the illiberal and the inclusive aspects of Garasanin’s nationalism were
inextricably linked with his notion of a predatory world political system. He
clearly conceptualised the complex global chessboard and Serbia’s place within
it. He explained those views in Nacertanije and followed the blueprint
throughout his three-decades-long engagement in politics. Individual and
national interests were structured by a single paramount consideration, the
state’s security. All other considerations – intra-national or international – were
filtered through the prism of inter-state relations.
Security matters required a large Serbia. Size mattered on a continent
dominated by large empires. Hence, if achieving a large state required an
inclusive and a tolerant form of nationalism, Garasanin was ready to embrace
it. Inclusion into the Serbian nation of the non-national Catholic and Muslim
South Slav population required managing religious differences – the one
overarching region-wide social cleavage. The solution he found was freedom of
religion. In contrast, inclusion into the Serbian state of a nationally conscious
Bulgarian population required recognition and equality. Whether the nations
that Garasanin recognised or did not recognise actually existed in the mid-
nineteenth century is indeed an important issue. Resolving it will require
clearly distinguishing between nationalism, the ideological movement, and
nations, the organisational cultures.120 Focusing the discussion on that crucial
issue should help not only to understand Garasanin but also his legacy, which
has stretched out to a very different time.
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